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policies coincide exactly with the closed-economy policies in all time periods. For
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used to manipulate the intertemporal terms of trade in the short run. Either way, the
fiscal externalities of source-based taxes vanish once residence-based taxes are allowed.
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Capital has become increasingly mobile between countries. This poses potentially
large problems for the taxation of capital, since a high tax on capital may lead to
capital flight to a country where the tax rate is lower. The risk of capital flight may
be even more severe when tax authorities rely mainly on source-based capital taxes,
such as corporate income taxes and withholding taxes; this will inevitably be the
case if information about capital income is not shared across jurisdictions. Concerns
over such “harmful tax competition” have been voiced, for instance, in commu-
niqués by the OECD (1998) and the European Union (2003).
However, recent agreements on information sharing between OECD and EU coun-
tries make it more feasible to levy capital taxes according to the residence princi-
ple. In particular, the Common Reporting Standard1 is now being implemented,
allowing for automatic information sharing between governments. This represents
a major shift in the enforceability of residence-based capital taxes, making it more
important than ever to understand the non-cooperative use of capital taxes by gov-
ernments who can deploy both residence- and source-based taxes in the presence of
capital mobility. The question we address here is the following: what is the effect of
capital market integration on capital taxes when governments can tax according to
the residence as well as the source principle?
We address this issue in the context of a multi-country neoclassical growth model
with an infinite horizon. Our choice of a fully dynamic model with endogenous
capital formation is crucial. In a static model, residence-based (savings) taxes are
lump-sum taxes. In a two-period model, the tax externalities are very different from
those in a fully dynamic model, as we emphasized in Gross et al. (2017) in a con-
text where only source-based taxes can be used. This difference may be even more
pronounced when residence-based taxes are also available because of their effect
on the rates of return to savings, thereby on capital accumulation, and hence the
1See European Union (2011), OECD (2017), and OECD (2018).
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global supply of capital over time. We restrict our attention to the case of perfect
commitment, in order to establish a benchmark.
We prove analytically that, at any interior steady state, all capital taxes are zero. This
result is quite important for our study: When countries have the same subjective
discount factor, a non-degenerate steady state only exists if residence-based capital
taxes are identical across countries—otherwise the country with the highest after-
tax rate of return will, in the limit, own the entire global stock of wealth. Therefore,
if countries were to differ in endowments, technology, or their agents’ preferences,
and if these differences were to result in different choices of residence-based capital
taxes, then the world economy would not converge to a non-degenerate wealth dis-
tribution. However, because we show that all countries choose the same long-run
residence-based capital tax rate (zero) regardless of asymmetries, we can sensibly
study environments where countries differ in more or less arbitrary ways, provided
only that they have the same subjective discount factor.
Our next finding in this new setting is that, when countries are symmetric or differ
with respect to population size and/or productivity only, the equilibrium of a non-
cooperative game is identical to the equilibrium in the absence of capital mobility;
in other words, it is as if the two economies were closed. We prove this analytically
(in an n-country world) and verify it numerically (in a two-country world). In such
an environment, source-based capital income taxes are always zero. The result that
source-based capital income taxes are always zero is similar to those by Bucovetsky
and Wilson (1991) and Eggert and Haufler (1999), who focus on identical countries,
and can thus be seen as an extension of these results from a two-period to an infinite-
horizon setting. In our fully dynamic model, however, residence-based capital taxes
are only initially high and then go to zero, as in a closed economy.
In consonance with this surprising result, we show that the fiscal externalities asso-
ciated with source-based capital taxes vanish when residence-based capital income
taxes are allowed. This holds even when countries differ with respect to other fea-
tures than population and productivity.
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However, while the fiscal externalities always vanish, when jurisdictions differ with
respect to some fundamentals not related to size or productivity, such as the initial
asset position, source-based taxes are associated with a terms-of-trade externality,
which does not arise for residence-based taxes. This externality, however, is tiny
compared to its counterpart when source-based taxes are the only type of capital
tax allowed. Importantly, while there are significant welfare costs of capital mobility
when only source-based taxes are allowed, we observe small, but positive, welfare
gains from capital mobility once savings taxes are available. The reason is that tax
competition is no longer harmful, and there are potential gains from (intertemporal)
trade. Therefore, increased capital-market integration may not be as problematic as
many have feared.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some of the related
literature. Section 4 presents the model framework and defines our equilibrium
concept. Section 4.2 contains our analytical results regarding optimal policy and
discusses the externalities stemming from capital taxes. In Section 5 we show our
quantitative results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
A large literature exists on tax competition with source-based taxes when the cap-
ital stock is exogenously given. The main idea is captured in the seminal papers
by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986): when capital becomes in-
ternationally mobile, then countries will lower their capital tax rates and provide
less public goods; this is inefficient and all countries would gain by a coordinated
tax increase. There is not enough space here to do justice to the many contributions
that followed, so we refer here to three excellent summaries/surveys. Wilson and
Wildasin (2004) review the theoretical arguments about whether tax competition is
a “bane or boon” by taking into account that tax competition may benefit citizens
if, for example, the government is non-benevolent as in Edwards and Keen (1996)
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and Eggert (2001). Nicodème (2006) situates the policy debate in the context of the
theoretical literature. Zodrow (2010) focusses on the nexus of the empirical and the-
oretical literature, noting that capital mobility has increased over time and is high,
that tax competition has taken place over statutory rates, but that the broadening of
the tax base has led to relatively constant effective marginal tax rates. One main im-
plication from the literature is that increased capital mobility will lead to an overall
decrease in tax rates. Exceptions include Cai and Treisman (2005) with productive
government spending and Baldwin and Krugman (2004) with trade by monopolis-
tically competitive firms. In these models, some countries lower their capital taxes
in response to tax competition while others increase theirs.
The various externalities associated with tax competition under the source principle
and an exogenous capital stock are well understood. The main one, which domi-
nates the tax competition literature, is the fiscal externality: a higher capital tax rate
in one jurisdiction leads to an outflow of capital to other jurisdictions, and thus a
higher tax base in them. If governments set capital taxes non-cooperatively, then
they do not take into account how their actions affect others’ tax bases. Because of
this positive externality, capital taxes in an open economy would tend to be lower
than in a closed economy.
Some more recent theoretical work argues that capital market integration might,
in some circumstances, lead to overtaxation of capital at the source. This literature
emphasizes the presence of alternative externalities that could counteract the afore-
mentioned fiscal externality.2
In the context of a static model with an exogenous capital stock, allowing for
residence-based capital taxes makes the optimal-tax problem trivial: these taxes are
then equivalent to lump-sum taxes which are generally assumed not to be available
in this type of framework (otherwise the optimal-tax problem is trivial). One way to
avoid triviality is to endogenize capital in the context of a two-period model; that is
2See, for example, Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002), Kessler et al. (2002), Makris (2006), Lockwood
and Makris (2006), Wooders et al. (2007), Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007), and the works cited therein.
Wilson (1999) and Wilson and Wildasin (2004) survey some of the previous literature.
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done in, for instance, Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) and Eggert and Haufler (1999)
with identical countries. Becker and Fuest (2011) also study a two-period model,
but capital flows in their setting are in terms of mergers and acquisitions instead
of foreign direct investment, in contrast to most of the literature. In this setting, the
availability of residence-based taxes may actually result in higher global distortions,
whereas policy with only source-based capital taxes is efficient. However, these pa-
pers do not fully take into account the dynamic aspects of taxation.
The literature on optimal taxation in a multi-period setting, pioneered by Chamley
(1986) and Judd (1985), has demonstrated that the results concerning capital taxes
differ markedly between a fully dynamic economy with endogenous capital accu-
mulation and one where capital is given as an endowment. Chamley and Judd
found that the optimal capital tax should initially be as high as possible (to tax the
initial capital stock, which is given as an endowment in the fully dynamic model as
well), but zero in the long run. Even though later work, for instance by Aiyagari
(1995) or Erosa and Gervais (2002), qualified the zero-tax result, they obtained the
same policy prescription: that capital accumulation should be undistorted in the
long run. In a large class of models, including New Dynamic Public Finance work,3
the modified golden rule of capital holds in the long run.4 An exception to this rule
is found in an environment where the tax system is incomplete (fewer tax instru-
ments than inputs into the production function), as Correia (1996b) and subsequent
studies have shown. All these papers assume perfect commitment. Since Kydland
and Prescott (1977) it is well known that capital taxes are too high in the absence
of commitment; see also Klein and Ríos-Rull (2003) and Klein et al. (2008). While
perfect commitment may not be a realistic assumption, it serves an important role
as a benchmark, as Kydland and Prescott (1980) argue.
In summary, there has been a lot of work on tax competition in static or two-period
models and on optimal taxation in a fully dynamic, but closed economy. Much less
attention has been devoted to optimal (or equilibrium) taxation in a fully dynamic
3See Golosov et al. (2003) and Kocherlakota (2010).
4See also Gross (2015b).
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open economy, i.e. when capital taxes distort both the intertemporal savings margin
as well as the allocation of capital across countries. A few papers employ a formally
dynamic model, but make specific functional-form assumptions so that capital taxes
do not affect the savings decision, as for instance in Köthenbürger and Lockwood
(2010) and Arcalean (2018). Lejour and Verbon (1998) only analyze steady states
without taking into account the transition. Wildasin (2003), Mendoza and Tesar
(2005), Becker and Rauscher (2007), and Hatfield (2015) impose time-invariance on
tax rates, meaning that the capital taxes at each time are a compromise between the
desire to highly tax the initial capital stock and to not tax capital in the long run.
This rules out any detailed period-by-period analysis of externalities. Klein et al.
(2005) and Quadrini (2005) study equilibrium taxation in an open economy with
limited commitment. Quadrini (2005) shows that in this context, tax competition
does reduce capital taxes, but that this constitutes a welfare improvement.
If lack of commitment implies inefficiently high capital taxes, and tax competition
drives down capital taxes, then it is important to know what the solution with per-
fect commitment is. It creates, as mentioned before, a benchmark against which
other policies can be evaluated. Under the assumption of perfect commitment, Cor-
reia (1996a) and Angyridis (2007) analyze optimal taxation in fully dynamic small
open economies where the international rate of return is exogenously given; these
economies have the property that, after exactly one period, the economy converges
to the long-run steady state where capital taxes are zero.5
Gross (2014) provides a framework to analyze optimal taxation in large open dy-
namic economies and finds that capital taxes are zero in the long run; Gross (2015a)
extends these results to a larger class of models and Gross (2018) examines the effects
5Correia (1996a, p.698) also discusses the similarity of the small open-economy solution (with
residence-based taxes) to the closed-economy solution. However, in her model there is no transi-
tional period with a capital tax strictly between 0 and 100 percent. This is because the rest of the
world is assumed to be in steady state. In our model, which includes the case of a small open eco-
nomy as a limiting case, all governments choose their taxes optimally at the same time, which leads
to identical solutions in every period for a closed and open economy, provided that countries are
sufficiently symmetric; specifically, if they differ, if at all, only with respect to population size and/or
productivity.
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of intergovernmental transfers in this context. These three papers all focus entirely
on the long run and do not analyze the transition to it.
Gross et al. (2017) study the entire transition from an arbitrary starting point to a
steady state. That work involved decomposing, analytically and computationally,
the externalities stemming from source-based capital taxes when residence-based
taxes are not available. Notably, in that paper, we found a savings externality (which
is obviously not present in static models), whereby governments do not take into
account that higher taxes will reduce savings and thus the capital stock, and thereby
harm other countries. This externality is zero at first, but then grows over time and
in the long run completely offsets the other externalities. The present study does for
a setting with both residence-based and source-based capital taxes what Gross et al.
(2017) did for a setting with source-based capital taxes alone.
3 The closed and the small open economy
In this section, we lay out the model environment and derive an equivalence result
for a closed economy and identical small open economies. In the next section (Sec-
tion 4), we generalize the result and analyze economies of any size and number and
various types of asymmetry.
Each country has a representative consumer and a representative competitive firm.
Physical capital is costlessly and immediately mobile across borders, while labour
is immobile. Savings are allocated across capital and government bonds in the var-
ious jurisdictions by transnational, competitive investors whose behaviour guaran-
tees that after-tax rates of return to all assets are equalized. The government of each
country aims to maximize its own representative consumer’s utility, issues govern-
ment bonds and can levy capital and labour taxes to finance a stream of endogenous
expenditures.
Capital taxes take the form of source-based taxes, which are paid by firms in the
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country where they produce, and residence-based taxes, which are paid by house-
holds in the country where they live. Residence-based taxes are paid on capital in-
come net of source-based taxes. The governments are able to commit to their future
taxes and thus engage in a one-shot game with each other, announcing a sequence
of taxes and bond issues at time zero, to which consumers, investors and firms then
react.
Since we only consider closed and small open economies in this section, there is no
strategic interaction between governments. Therefore, we do not treat the optimal
taxation problem as a game between governments.
3.1 The Representative Consumer
Let there be a measure χi of consumers in each country i. A representative consumer
in a country i takes prices and taxes as given and ranks allocations according to the












where u(c, l) is a period utility function that is strictly increasing and concave in
consumption c and leisure l. The subjective discount factor is denoted by β ∈ (0, 1).
Government spending is denoted by git and v(·) is a strictly increasing and concave
function, with limg→0 vg =∞. The consumer divides up her total available time




t. The per-period budget constraint is:













where wit is the wage, τ
i
a,t the tax on savings, τ
i
n,t the tax on labour, a
i
t are asset
holdings, and Rt is the world market rate of return. In an open-economy context,
τia,t should be thought of as a residence-based tax on capital income; the notation is
motivated by the fact that it is a tax on asset returns (from whatever source). Initial
asset holdings ai0 are exogenously given.
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Utility maximization with respect to labour supply nit and private consumption c
i
t
implies the familiar labour-leisure trade-off and “Euler” equation characterizing the
optimal trade-off between consumption in the current period versus the next (sub-



















Equations (2), (3), and (4), together with initial asset holdings and no-Ponzi-scheme
conditions (which we leave out to avoid tedious notation) characterize consumer
behaviour.
3.2 Firms and Production
There are many identical firms which are perfectly competitive. They rent capital
kit and hire labour n
i
t to produce output according to a concave production function










function includes a linear depreciation term, where the depreciation rate is denoted




t are all in per capita terms,
so that yit, for instance, is output per head. Our assumptions imply zero profits








We assume throughout that the marginal product of capital is strictly positive, and
hence rit > 0.
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3.3 Investors
Investors collect savings on behalf of consumers and invest them in capital kit and
government bonds bit in such a way as to maximize their profits (which are zero
in equilibrium due to perfect competition and constant returns to scale).6 Capital
returns are taxed at source in each country at rate τik,t. Let r^
i
t denote the net return
on government bonds.7 The representative investor’s profit maximization problem







































The first-order conditions imply the usual no-arbitrage conditions. Specifically, the









Due to our assumption of perfect and immediate capital mobility, these no-arbitrage
conditions hold in every period t, including at t = 0. Equations (8) and (9) charac-
terize the investors’ behaviour. Anticipating the analysis of Section 4 we note that,
6Investors are not a necessary element of our model, but they simplify the exposition and analysis.
In the absence of investors, all consumers would have to choose the composition of their investment
portfolio, and not just its total value. This means that for each country, the representative consumer
there would have to choose how much capital to invest in each of the countries (and similarly for
government bonds). The number of variables would thus explode as the number of countries gets
larger. Though this does not noticeably affect the analysis of a small open economy, it becomes im-
portant in the context of Section 4, where we assume that there are m different (large) countries. In
our setup, we have government bonds, capital and private assets in each country, or 3m financial
variables; without investors, the number of such variables would be 2m2. Furthermore, the aggre-
gate capital stock employed in each country and the net foreign asset position in each country are
uniquely determined, but not what fraction of a given country’s capital stock is owned by residents
of another; without investors, the portfolio composition of each consumer would thus be indetermi-
nate. See also Gross (2014).
7The absence of arbitrage opportunities requires that returns on government bonds have to be
equal to returns on capital; see below. It therefore does not matter whether bond returns are taxed at
source or not at all.
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in the context of large open economies, imposing Equations (8) and (9), allows us to
treat r^it for all i and Rt as being under the control of each government j.
3.4 The Government
Each benevolent (but nationalistic) government maximizes the utility of its own rep-
resentative consumer. It finances its endogenously chosen government purchases
{git}
∞
t=0 via source- and residence-based taxes on capital income, as well as labour
income taxes. Governments may also issue one-period debt (subject to a no-Ponzi-
scheme condition, which we omit here). Initial government debt bi0 is exogenously
given. In order to avoid confiscatory lump-sum taxation of initial assets, we stipu-
late that residential capital taxes may not exceed 100%, as is common in the optimal-
taxation literature. As mentioned above, residence-based capital taxes are applied
to the rate of return net of source-based capital taxes. The government’s per-period
budget constraint can be written as
git + b
i



















3.5 Optimal taxation in a closed economy
In the context of a closed economy, it is meaningless to distinguish between a source-
and a residence-based capital income tax, and so we set τik,t = 0. In this section, we
make use of the primal approach to optimal taxation, as described in Lucas and
Stokey (1983); a powerful tool in the context of a closed or small open economy.
It exploits the result that an allocation forms part of a competitive equilibrium, for
some prices and taxes, if and only if it satisfies (a) the sequence of resource con-





















Equation (11) follows from eliminating after-tax prices from a consumer’s intertem-
poral budget constraint by using the private sector optimality conditions. Since this
is standard, we do not go through the derivation in detail here.












for t = 0, 1, . . . Additionally, we impose τia,t ≤ 1 for t = 0, 1, . . ., and these con-




for t = 0, 1, . . . Alternatively, we could analyze optimal taxation in a closed economy
using the dual approach; that will be relevant later on, when we analyze large open
economies. See Appendix A.
3.6 Optimal taxation in a small open economy
In a small open economy, the rate of return Rt is exogenously given and the imple-

































t + (1+ Rt)ζ
i
t
for t = 0, 1, . . ., where Ξit is the net foreign asset position (NFAP). With open
economies, it is meaningful to distinguish between a source- and a residence-based
capital income tax. Notice that the source-based capital income tax τik,t appears
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nowhere in the implementability condition (12) nor in the above sequence of re-
source constraints. It only appears in the no-arbitrage condition Rt = rit(1− τ
i
k,t).
Characterizing the solution to the government’s problem, we find that the first-order
condition with respect to τik,t implies that the Lagrange multiplier associated with
the above no-arbitrage condition is zero. This in turn implies that the first-order
conditions for the net foreign asset position and capital reduce to Fik,t = Rt for
t = 0, 1, . . . Together with the above no-arbitrage condition and rit = F
i
k,t, we then
have that τik,t = 0 for all t = 0, 1, . . . , and, in particular, that R0 = r0. Therefore, the
implementability condition reduces to its closed-economy counterpart.
When countries are symmetric, the net foreign asset position is zero, and so we
have Ξit = 0, meaning that the national resource constraints reduce to the closed-
economy resource constraints. Hence the solution to the government’s problem
in a small open economy has to be exactly equal that in a closed economy. This
establishes equivalence between closed and symmetric small open economies, not
only in steady state, but along the transition path as well.8 Notice that allowing for
residence-based taxes is essential in this context: ruling them out would destroy the
equivalence to the closed economy that we demonstrate here.
4 Large open economies
We now describe a model environment consisting of finitely many countries
i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. This raises a host of conceptual issues that arise neither in a closed
economy nor in a small open economy. For one, the primal approach is no longer
8This result extends that of Correia (1996a), who shows that, in a small open economy, source-
based capital taxes should always be zero and residence-based taxes at their upper bound in the
initial period, followed immediately by zero. This is in contrast to a closed economy (to which our
world consisting of many identical small open economies is equivalent), where the residence-based
capital income tax is at its upper limit for several periods followed by one transitional period where it
is strictly between zero and the upper bound, followed by zero. The difference between the result in
Correia (1996a) and ours arises because she assumes that the the whole world is already in a steady
state in the initial period.
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valid. The reason is that the primal approach does not allow us to distinguish prop-
erly between what is exogenously given to a government and what it can influence
through its policy choices. More precisely, the idea behind the primal approach is
to characterize the set of allocations that can be supported as part of a competitive
equilibrium by some set of prices and taxes and then let the government choose
the best allocation in that set. But that idea is not useful in the context of a world
consisting of large, open economies. In that context, no single country can choose
freely among all the possible competitive equilibria for the world because no single
country can control the policy choices of the other countries. In a non-cooperative
game, a given country asks: what allocations can be implemented given the policies
of the other countries? It does not ask: what allocations can be implemented for
some taxes set by me and by the other countries?
Therefore, it is inappropriate to eliminate the taxes levied by other governments
from the problem of a given government by using the private sector optimality con-
ditions of those other countries. Though it is of course possible (and valid) to elim-
inate the given country’s taxes from its own problem, that would still leave us with
the tax rates of the other countries. Thus the approach, in order to remain valid,
would be only partially primal, destroying its practical advantages. This leads us to
adopt the dual approach. See Appendix A for a description of the dual approach as
it applies to a closed economy.
4.1 Equilibrium
At time t = 0, governments simultaneously announce their policies for the infinite
future. Households, firms, and investors then react to the announced policies in
such a way as to maximize utility/profits. Incorporating their optimality conditions
as constraints into each government’s problem allows us to treat all the private sec-
tor’s choice variables (both at home and abroad) as each government’s own control
variables. When choosing its policies, each government considers the taxes and debt
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of other governments as exogenously fixed and equal to their equilibrium levels.
Meanwhile, in response to a deviation from equilibrium on the part of one gov-
ernment, other governments respond automatically by adjusting their government
spending in each period so as to satisfy their per-period (flow) government bud-
get constraint, leaving taxes and government debt unchanged. That is, government
consumption is not thought of as an action in the game-theoretic sense. This is to
ensure that the world remains in competitive equilibrium, even off the equilibrium
path.
Given the automatic adjustment of government spending, we may regard the setup
as a game in the sense of Nash (1950), provided that no government is allowed to
set policies in such a way as to force any other government to reduce their spending
below zero. Thus we may regard our equilibrium concept as a Nash equilibrium,
subject to this proviso.
Alternatively, we may define equilibrium in another way that avoids this implicit
restriction on strategies, and which in our particular environment turns out to have
exactly the same implications as the one we just described. Under this alternative
equilibrium concept, other governments do not respond automatically to deviations
on the part of any government. As a result, a deviation from equilibrium on the part
of one government will typically render the other governments either insolvent or
overfunded as private agents (investors and consumers) respond to the deviation.
It follows that the setup is not a game in the sense of Nash (1950). This is because
the set of feasible strategies available to any one government depends on what the
others are doing; Nash’s concept of a game explicitly rules this out.
The setup then instead becomes a “generalized game” in the sense of Debreu (1952),
a concept applied in the seminal work by Arrow and Debreu (1954). In the words of
Dasgupta and Maskin (2015), a generalized game “allow[s] for the possibility that a
player’s set of strategies might depend on the strategy choices of other players.” We
could then apply the equilibrium concept that Debreu developed for the purpose of
analyzing generalized games, namely a social equilibrium. A social equilibrium is a
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strategy profile such that each agent chooses the best strategy from the set of strate-
gies available to her given the strategies of the other agents. Notice that each agent
in a social equilibrium, when contemplating what to do, ignores the fact that her
out-of-equilibrium choices may render the other agents’ equilibrium strategies in-
feasible.9 We note here, for the record, that the social equilibrium concept in Debreu
(1952) is not the same as the concept of competitive equilibrium defined in Arrow
and Debreu (1954).
The social equilibrium concept implies that off-equilibrium behaviour is generically
not consistent with competitive equilibrium for the world as a whole; the worldwide
resource constraint will typically not hold if a single government deviates, though
it will of course hold in a social equilibrium.10 As we mentioned above, this alterna-
tive equilibrium concept leads here to the same prediction in terms of equilibrium
allocations and policies with that under the above equilibrium concept.11
We note also that there are many distinct specifications of the game between gov-
ernments that, unlike social equilibrium, rely on an automatic adjustment of some
policy. For instance, instead of letting government spending adjust automatically
so as to satisfy the flow government budget constraint, labour taxes could adjust
automatically. These alternative equilibrium concepts are not equivalent; not to our
concept and not to each other.12
9See, for instance, Equations (4) and (5) in Dasgupta and Maskin (2015).
10A more detailed discussion of the equilibrium concept as applied in this paper can be found in
Gross (2014), which considers source-based taxes.
11This equivalence result unfortunately does not generalize much; it typically fails if the utility
function is not additively separable over private and public consumption. Also, the equilibrium
concept that utilizes automatic adjustment of government spending can obviously not be used in an
environment where government spending is exogenously fixed, and so the question of equivalence
would not even arise. In the latter case, however, the social equilibrium policies (and allocations)
remain well-defined.
12For a deeper examination of these equilibrium issues, when one fiscal-policy variable per period
adjusts residually, see Gross (2018).
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4.2 Optimal policy
We now characterize the optimal policy of some fixed country j’s government, using















































































































where, for instance, θi,jt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with country j’s gov-
ernment optimization problem and the household budget constraint of residents of
country i. Note thatwit and r
i




t as described in Equations (5)
and (6), and lit = 1−n
i
t. The constraint associated with the multiplier φ
j
t states that
the after-tax returns on assets cannot be negative.
In what follows, we will never have occasion to explicitly refer to the Lagrange
multipliers associated with the optimization problem of more than one country at a













t, where the single superscript i refers to a particular
constraint rather than a particular country’s optimization problem. Similarly we








We have substituted in for the equilibrium prices of governments bonds, i.e. re-
placed r^jt with Rt, thus eliminating the corresponding investors’ optimality condi-























In this section, we show that if a country converges to a strictly positive stationary
allocation (cj > 0, nj > 0, gj > 0) or “steady state”, then its government wants to set
taxes so as to ensure that this allocation is intertemporally efficient. What we mean
by that is that it satisfies the modified golden rule:
Definition 1 A stationary allocation for a given country j is called intertemporally effi-
cient if it satisfies
β[1+ Fjk,t] = 1.
In our context, given our choice of tax instruments, intertemporal efficiency implies




Proposition 1 If an economy converges to an interior stationary allocation, then its gov-
ernment wants to set taxes so as to ensure that this allocation is intertemporally efficient.
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g,t = ψt (16)
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From constant returns to scale we have the identity that F(k,n) ≡ wn+ rk (where
of course w and r are the marginal products of labour and capital, respectively), so








If the economy converges to a stationary allocation, where gjt+1 = g
j
t > 0, it follows









t, we can conclude from the household’s Euler equation (4)





k,t) = 1/β. (22)










13To put this in the context of Straub and Werning (2020), we do not assume that Lagrange multi-
pliers converge. However, our result does depend on the assumption that the economy converges to
an interior (non-degenerate) steady state. The contrary possibility, while genuine, is a remote one. It
arises only if initial government debt is extremely high and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
is strictly below unity.
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Equations (21) and (23) imply that (1− τja,t)(1− τ
j
k,t) = 1. From equation (22), we
can thus infer that with a stationary allocation, 1+ Fjk,t = 1/β.
Combining intertemporal efficiency with the no-arbitrage condition that must hold
under capital mobility, it follows that τia,t = τ
j
a,t for all i and j so that all countries
prefer to tax assets at the same rate in a non-degenerate steady state.
This result is interesting in itself, but it is also crucial for the existence of a non-
degenerate steady state for the world as a whole, i.e. one where all countries con-
verge to non-zero levels of private and public consumption. It defuses the following
challenge to any open-economy model where taxes are endogenous: We know that
if each country has the same subjective discount factor and capital can be traded
across countries, then all countries must have the same after-tax rates of return;
otherwise, the country or countries with the highest one will own all capital in
the long run. With capital mobility, equal after-tax rates of return implies equal
residence-based capital tax rates. But why a priory would asymmetric countries
choose the same residence-based tax rates? Fortunately, the aforementioned result
implies equal residence-based capital income taxes across countries. Thus we can
safely conclude that, for a large set of parameter values, including those where coun-
tries differ significantly in many dimensions, there is a non-degenerate steady state
for the world, provided only that the subjective time discount factor β is identical
across countries.
4.4 Zero Capital Taxes
Chamley (1986) found that optimal capital taxes are zero in the long-run in a closed
economy, for the specific model also considered here. Gross (2014) showed that the
Chamley result extends to open economies (with only source-based capital taxes).
In this section, we prove that if Lagrange multipliers converge, then both residence-
and source-based capital taxes are zero in the long run.14 In our numerical exper-
14All results hold whether government spending is endogenous or exogenous (as long as the eco-
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iments, we have not come across any indications that Lagrange multipliers would
not converge. Furthermore, it can be shown that if allocations converge and the
growth rates of taxes or Lagrange multipliers converge, then the limiting growth rates
are zero; in other words, taxes and Lagrange multipliers then do in fact converge.
Proposition 2 If all economies converge to an interior stationary allocation and Lagrange
multipliers converge, then both source- and residence-based capital taxes converge to zero.























From the Euler equation (4) of household i 6= j, we have 1/β = 1+ Rt+1(1− τia,t+1),
which together with Equation (25) implies ω = 0. Doing the same for the house-
holds in country j and using ω = 0 shows that ψτja,tRt = 0; since ψ > 0 and
Rt > 0, it follows that τ
j






k,t) = 1/β and
1+ rjt = 1/β, so τ
j
k,t = 0.
4.5 Equivalence of Closed and Open Economies
Our most surprising result is that if countries are symmetric, except possibly in
terms of population size and/or labour productivity, then the solution to each gov-
ernment’s optimization problem is identical in all periods for a closed and an open
economy. The main idea of the proof is to establish that, if there is sufficient sym-
metry across jurisdictions, the additional constraints implied by international cap-
ital mobility (no-arbitrage conditions and world capital market clearing) are non-
binding in the sense that the associated Lagrange multipliers vanish.
nomy converges to an interior steady state). Including transfer payments from governments to citi-
zens does not affect this result either (although the transition certainly looks different).
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Proposition 3 If all economies differ only, if at all, in country size χi and/or labour produc-
tivity Zi, and if initial assets ai0/Z
i and debt bi0/Z
i per efficiency unit of labour are common
across countries, then the open-economy solution is identical to the closed-economy solution.
Proof. We reformulate the problem slightly, by eliminating Rt as a choice variable
and replacing it with the after-tax return rit(1 − τ
i
k,t); this obviously removes one
constraint, now there are only m− 1 constraints related to the no-arbitrage condi-
tion. We also define r˜it ≡ rit(1− τik,t) and use r˜jt as a choice variable instead of τjk,t.
This is possible because τjk,t is always multiplied by r
j
t in the problem above. r˜
i
t, for
i 6= j, is not a choice variable, since the foreign taxes are not choice variables. The



















































































































































The difference between an open and a closed economy is that in an open economy
the capital-market clearing condition (with multiplier ωt) does not necessarily im-




t and that there are the additional no-arbitrage conditions (with
multipliers γit, i 6= j). The other countries’ household optimality conditions and




t, i 6= j) are not directly affected by
domestic choice variables. Therefore, if we can show that the capital-market clear-




t in equilibrium and that the
no-arbitrage conditions are non-binding, i.e. the Lagrange multipliers γit, i 6= j are
equal to zero, then the closed and open economy solutions have to be identical. The
domestic government’s first-order conditions with respect to foreign private deci-
sions will then only determine the domestic government’s multipliers attached to
foreign households’ optimality conditions and budget constraints.
When countries are symmetric, then the open-economy capital-market clearing con-




t. Note that since the constraints and variables are defined
in per-capita terms, this also applies to countries which are asymmetric only in pop-
ulation size; moreover, due to constant returns to scale, this extends to differences




























where ζj−1 ≡ 0. From this condition it generally does not follow that γit = 0. This is
reassuring, as open and closed economies are not identical when only source-based



















t = 0. (29)
In an open economy, r˜jt will optimally never be zero (otherwise it would lead to a
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Inserting this into equation (28) yields∑
i 6=j
γit = ψt(kt + bt − at).
Since countries are symmetric, γit = 0, for all i 6= j.16 It follows that the open and
closed economy solutions are identical, if residence-based taxes are available.17
This result also illustrates that source-based capital taxes are only used to manip-
ulate the terms of trade, depending on whether the country is a capital importer
(kt + bt > at) or a capital exporter (kt + bt < at). We explore this further in the next
section.
Discussion We now turn to a discussion of the intuition behind our equivalence
result. To set the stage, notice that each government would ideally like to tax the
exogenously given endowments. In a dynamic economy such as ours, the endow-
ments are (i) the representative consumer’s efficiency units of labour in each period
and (ii) initial assets. Labour taxes, though they are distortive because leisure is en-
dogenous, are the nearest available instrument for taxing efficiency units of labour,
and so labour taxes are used in all periods under a very wide range of assumptions.
Now notice that a residence-based capital tax in the initial period is literally a lump-
sum tax on the endowment of initial assets, in contrast to a source-based tax, which
15Under our assumption that the marginal product of capital is positive, i.e. rit > 0 ∀ i, the possi-
bility that r˜it = 0 ∀ i would imply that τik,t = 1 ∀ i. This cannot be an equilibrium, as an infinitesimal
decrease in the source-based capital tax τjk,t would lead to a non-continuous jump of the capital stock
(in fact, all the capital would move into country j).
16Since the constraints and endowments for all foreign countries are identical, the Lagrange mul-
tipliers must be identical, γi = γι, for ι, i 6= j, otherwise the first-order conditions with respect to
variables kit and n
i




t. Because variables are
defined in per-capita terms, and can be defined in terms of efficiency units of labour, this is true for
differences in country size or labour productivity, too. For different country sizes, for example, the
Lagrange multipliers of foreign constraints would then simply be multiplied by χi.
17See Appendix A for a description of the dual approach to the optimal taxation problem of a
closed economy.
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is not. More generally, asset income (residence-based) and capital income (source-
based) taxes distort the intertemporal margin in the same way, discouraging the
accumulation of assets. Capital taxes also lead to an outflow of capital from the
jurisdiction that levies them, while asset taxes do not. This makes capital taxes more
distortionary than asset taxes, rendering them a less attractive source of revenue.
Consequently, if a government has a choice between raising revenue by levying an
asset income tax and a capital income tax, it always chooses to tax assets rather than
capital, because the former comes closer to being a lump-sum tax than the latter.
The point here is not that a government with access to residence-based taxes will
never tax capital at source; the point is that no government will tax capital at source
in order to raise revenue. It will not because revenue can be raised at a lower cost by
taxing asset income. It may nevertheless tax capital at source in order to manipulate
the intertemporal terms of trade, but this only happens in an economy where one coun-
try is a capital exporter and hence at least one other an importer. The latter of course
does not happen if the countries are symmetric so that there are no capital flows in
equilibrium.
Moreover, in an economy where capital income is not taxed at source and where
neither country is a capital exporter or importer, source-based capital income taxes
are not associated with any externalities (see below for a precise definition of exter-
nalities). In that situation, a small flow of capital from one jurisdiction to another,
induced by a small change in the capital tax, does not affect welfare in either place.
The reason is that, in a situation where capital is, in equilibrium, not taxed at source
so that capital is paid its marginal product, receiving a small inflow of capital leaves
residents of a country no better and no worse off. In general, the representative
native of a competitive economy (with constant returns to scale and diminishing re-
turns to labour and capital separately), is indifferent with respect to a small inflow
of capital (the same argument holds for a small inflow of labour). A small inflow of
capital leads to a lower marginal product capital, and a higher marginal product of
labour, thereby hurting owners of capital and benefiting workers. The total benefit
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to domestic workers and capital owners has to be zero, though, since capital is paid
its marginal product. If the residents of a country are identical and the country’s net
foreign asset position is zero, then the residents benefit as much from a small cap-
ital inflow in their capacity as workers as they are hurt in their capacity as capital
owners.18
A similar argument can be constructed to establish why, in an economy where cap-
ital income is not taxed at source and economies are sufficiently symmetric so that
capital flows are zero, the externalities associated with residence-based capital in-
come taxes are zero as well. The reason is that a resident of either country is indif-
ferent on the margin with respect to an increase in the world capital stock, keeping
her own wealth constant. That is, if residents of country 1 accumulate a bit more
or a bit less savings, that is a matter of indifference to residents of country 2. So if
the government of country 1 raises or cuts the residence based capital income tax
slightly, this will have no first-order effect on the welfare of residents of country 2.
The conclusion, then, is that, in an economy where (i) both source-based and
residence-based capital taxes are available and (ii), jurisdictions are sufficiently sym-
metric that there are no capital flows between them in equilibrium, the equilibrium
is such that (a) source-based capital income taxes are not used and (b) residence-
based capital income taxes are set exactly as they would be in a closed economy,
rendering capital mobility irrelevant.
4.6 Externalities
In Gross et al. (2017) we identified the cross-border externality from source-based
capital taxes when residence-based capital taxes are not available. In order to fa-
cilitate a comparison, we restrict our attention here to the case of two countries,
“home” and “foreign”, where variables associated with the “home” country are de-
18Residents are not indifferent with respect to a large inflow, however, since the NFAP would then
be negative, and foreigners would bear part of the burden of lower capital income.
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noted by h and the foreign country by f. For instance, cht is per capita consumption
at home and cft is consumption abroad. Meanwhile, θ
h
t is the Lagrange multiplier of
the home government’s problem associated with the home house households’ pe-
riod t budget constraint and θft is the Lagrange multiplier of the home government’s
problem associated with the foreign households’ period t budget constraint.19
We show here that the externalities associated with source-based capital taxes in the
context of a hybrid system (indicated with H) are very different from their coun-
terparts in a source-based only system (indicated by S): the fiscal externality van-
ishes. On the other hand, they are very similar to the externalities associated with
residence-based capital taxes.
As in Gross et al. (2017), we define the period t externality associated with a tax
as the effect on domestic welfare of a marginal change in the foreign government’s
source or residence-based capital tax rate at some date t, where the foreign govern-
ment offsets the change in revenues by adjusting its bonds in each period and the
labour tax at date t to balance its budget constraint.20 It is thus a well-defined de-
viation from the optimal policy of the foreign government, feasible from its point of
view. Meanwhile, the home government, consistently with our equilibrium concept,
responds by automatically adjusting its governments spending in period t to pre-
serve government budget balance. Notice, however, that this marginal adjustment
does not matter for home welfare because government spending is already opti-
mal. It follows that the externality we define here would be exactly the same under
the social equilibrium concept. In any case, the externality does take into account
19Notice, again, that we will never have occasion to refer explicitly to the Lagrange multipliers of
the foreign government’s problem, though of course they exist in the background and may differ
from those of the home government’s problem.
20An increase in foreign capital taxes at time t leads to an increase in tax revenues in that time
period, and it also changes the entire sequence of prices (such as rt) and private-sector choices (such
as aft and a
h
t ). The foreign government budget constraint would thus not hold with equality in any
time period. To analyze deviations that are feasible from the foreign government’s point of view, we
therefore adjust new government bonds bfs+1 in every time period s ≥ 0 and labour taxes τfn,t in time
period t, so that the government budget constraint holds in every period, as well as intertemporally.
Changing only government bonds in every period, but not labour taxes at time t would lead to a
total increase in tax revenues. If we only changed labour taxes at time t, then the foreign government
budget constraint in period t− 1, for example, would not hold with equality.
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how the foreign government’s policy change affects the home government’s budget
constraints; notice below, in Equation (31), that the Lagrange multipliers associated
with these constraints appear in the equation for the externality.
Taking the differential (or approximating the discrete change) of home utility with
respect (in response) to the foreign source-based capital tax deviation, we find the




















































































For notational convenience, we have written this for any time period t and define
ζi−1 ≡ 0 for i = {h, f}. From here one could derive precisely the externalities we had
identified in Gross et al. (2017), including the familiar fiscal externality represented






a,t), by setting τ
i
a,t = 0. But we can also use the first-














































































































We now describe these externalities briefly: The Savings Externality results from the
fact that the foreign government does not take into account that an increase in its
capital tax will negatively affect the home government through reduced global sav-
ings (and hence a smaller global capital stock). A higher capital tax reduces the
world-wide rate of return and thereby diminishes savings. The key is the Lagrange
multiplier of the household’s intertemporal optimality condition, ζft−1. The lower
global rate of return due to higher capital taxes also benefits borrowers and hurts




t and a neg-





21 The next two externalities are more subtle. When the
foreign government increases its source-based taxes at time t, then new debt issues
bfs+1 in all periods s = 0, 1 . . . ,∞ adjust, as well as labour taxes at time t. Because
changes in capital taxes at any time period change the entire sequence of prices and
private-sector choices, this is necessary to satisfy the government budget constraint
in all periods; moreover, labour taxes decrease to satisfy the intertemporal budget
constraint. The foreign government does not take into account how these changes
in its debt and labour taxes affect the home government, whence the Debt and For-
21The θft appears in this term because the home government also values resources that the foreign
households lose/gain due to the changing terms of trade; θft may be positive or negative.
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eign Labour Externality. For the latter, a reduction in foreign labour taxes implies that
foreign households work more (see the term with Lagrange multiplier µft, which is
for the foreign household’s optimal labour-leisure tradeoff). The foreign household
may also have more or less resources left after the shift from labour to capital taxes,
















k,t. Note that the entire term
would be zero if there were no change in the relative size of the tax bases (of labour
and both types of capital taxes). In general, the term should be small, because the
foreign government raises the same amount of tax revenues and merely shifts the
composition of its taxes, especially since we consider a small change from the opti-
mal equilibrium policy. The Debt Externality arises because an increase (a decrease)
in foreign government debt leaves less (more) savings in global capital markets for
capital and domestic debt; the foreign government takes this effect of course into
account when making its decisions, but not how it affects the domestic government.
For ease of reference, we restate here the externality ES(τfk,t) associated with source-
based capital taxes when residence-based capital taxes are not available, as in Gross









































































We can note the following two main differences:
1. The fiscal externality completely disappears when residence-based capital
taxes are available—this is the most important difference. Governments use
source-based capital income taxes only to manipulate the intertemporal terms
of trade, not to raise revenues, because it is more efficient to raise revenues
through residence-based taxes. The reason is that residence-based taxes distort
only savings, whereas source-based taxes distort savings and the allocation of
capital across jurisdictions. Thus, when foreign source-based taxes increase,
leading to an inflow of capital into the home country, then this does not rele-
vantly affect the domestic tax base, since any tax revenues from source-based
taxes (if they are non-zero) are purely incidental.
2. The savings externality when residence-based capital taxes are available stems
only from the foreign households (the term with ζft−1) and not from the home
households: the term with ζht−1 has disappeared. This is because the home
government can perfectly determine the rate of return of the home consumer
through residence-based taxes, while the source-based tax only does so imper-
fectly. Of course rft is also multiplied by 1− τ
f















k,t. This stems from the fact that higher capital taxes reduce
the tax base for asset taxes.
It is also instructive to consider the externality from residence-based capital taxes,
i.e. EH(τfa,t), and how it differs from the externality from source-based taxes (the
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the expressions EH(τfk,t) and EH(τ
f
a,t) are exactly the same, except that every τ
f
a,t
is switched for τfk,t and vice versa.
22 It is only with per-capita asymmetries and
non-zero net foreign asset positions that the terms of trade externality really distin-
guishes the two types of externalities. This also follows of course from our previous
result that all externalities are zero when countries are symmetric (since γft = 0).
5 Numerical results
In this section we investigate the quantitative implications of the model for a range
of parameter values. We view this as an exercise in quantitative theory, where we
parameterize the model so as to make the results broadly speaking empirically rel-
evant. The goal is to highlight the mechanisms at play in this form of tax com-
petition, not to account for any specific historical episode. For computational and
expositional ease we again confine our attention to a two-country world.
First, we describe the calibration of a scenario with symmetric countries. Second, we
exhibit optimal fiscal policy for a closed economy to establish a baseline and contrast
















it with the results we obtain in an open economy, once with only source-based cap-
ital taxes and then with both source and residence-based ones. Third, we introduce
asymmetries which highlight when and how optimal policy in an open economy
differs from a closed economy. We show our main results concerning capital taxes
in table format in the paper, and we relegate figures to Appendix D.
5.1 Parameterization
For the parametrization we use a model economy in steady state (which we call the
“pre-initial steady state”) with a zero net foreign asset position, satisfying all the
government’s optimality conditions, except that government debt is exogenously
given. In particular, the “pre-initial steady state” satisfies all the constraints in the
planning problem (13), as well as the first-order conditions of its choice variables,
except for bonds bjt+1. We impose for all variables that they are equal in all periods,
so ζjt−1 = ζ
j
t for example. See Appendix B for further details. It does not matter
whether this pre-initial steady state is that of a closed or an open economy where
the NFAP is zero.
We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function,
F(kt,nt) = Zkαt n
1−α
t − δkt.
We set Z = 1.0, the capital share α = 0.35, and the depreciation rate to δ = 0.08.
The utility functions take the form u(ct,nt) = ln(ct) − ρnσt and v(gt) = Γ ln(gt). We
choose σ = 3 in order for the Frisch labour-supply elasticity to be 0.5. The subjective
discount factor, β, is set equal to 0.9615 so that the annual return to capital (net of
depreciation and taxes) in the pre-initial steady state is 4.0%. We then calibrate the
remaining parameters (ρ = 6.13 and Γ = 0.74 in the utility function) and initial
government debt (b0 = 0.36) so that hours worked are 0.33, government debt is
60% of GDP, and government revenues are 35% of GDP in the pre-initial steady
state. Initial total assets held by households (a0 = 2.09) are determined as the sum
of government debt and capital in each country. The target that hours worked are
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0.33 follows convention, but it is inconsequential, as it merely determines the unit
in which hours worked are measured. In the OECD, government revenues were
roughly 35% on average in 2016. Since we do not distinguish between transfers and
government purchases, we calibrate the model from the revenue side.
5.2 Symmetric environment
A result in Atkeson et al. (1999) applies to our closed economy model. The result
says that the upper limit on capital taxes binds for a finite number of periods, after
which we have a non-zero capital tax for exactly one more period, followed by zero
asset taxes. The results we present here for a closed economy are thus not new or
of any particular importance in themselves; the purpose they serve here is merely
to establish a reference point to which we can compare our new findings in an open
economy. We first show in Table 1 a numerical verification of our most important
analytic result: taxes and allocations of symmetric countries, when capital can flow
freely across the border (allowing for residence-based taxes), are exactly identical to
the ones in a closed economy. Moreover, the overall externality is zero (see Figure 2).
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Capital taxes when countries are symmetric
Closed economies Open economy
Period τha τfa τha τfa NFAP τhk τ
f
k
0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00


















50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 1: τha and τhk are the home residence- and source-based capital tax rates, τ
f
a
and τfk are the foreign counterparts. NFAP is the net foreign asset position from the
point of view of the home country, expressed as a fraction of home output.
We contrast this with the results we obtain when we do not allow for residence-
based taxes, the classic case of tax competition, in Table 2 and Figure 1.23 Even
though the two countries are symmetric, the positive externality of source-based
23These results are very similar to the ones from our previous work, Gross et al. (2017). Also note
that there is no expropriation of capital in the first period t = 0, because capital is mobile in each
period, including time period 0. The stock of assets in each country (and thus the global capital
stock) is determined one period in advance, but at the beginning of each period investors decide
where to allocate capital. Hence,
∑m
i=1 χ




capital taxes (in the absence of savings taxes) leads to a significant reduction in cap-
ital taxes in the short run and to a protracted convergence to zero in the long run.
Comparing a closed to an open economy, there are substantial welfare losses, equiv-
alent to the loss of 1.19% of private consumption in each period. This welfare loss is
of course due to the externalities associated with tax competition (see Figure 2), and
the fact that there are no offsetting gains from trade in capital since the countries are
symmetric.
Capital taxes with symmetric countries—source-based taxes only








0 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.39 0.39
1 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.36 0.36
2 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.33
3 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.30 0.30
4 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.27 0.27
5 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.25
6 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.23 0.23
7 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.21 0.21
8 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.19 0.19
9 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.17 0.17














50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 2: τha and τhk are the home residence- and source-based capital tax rates, τ
f
a
and τfk are the foreign counterparts. NFAP is the net foreign asset position from the
point of view of the home country, expressed as a fraction of home output.
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Our main result has important ramifications for tax competition: the famous race to
the bottom in capital taxes known from the received literature on tax competition
seems to rely entirely on the inability to tax the initial asset holdings of domestic
residents through residence-based taxes.24 As shown before in Gross (2014) and
Gross (2015a), steady-state capital taxes are the same whether the economy is open
or closed, and tax competition is thus not an issue in the long run. If governments
are able to tax initial asset holdings through residence-based taxes as in this paper,
then tax competition has no effects whatsoever, even in the short run. The welfare
gains/losses from an open economy as compared to a closed economy are thus zero.
5.3 Asymmetries
As we have shown in our theoretical description of externalities, source-based taxes
have the same externality as residence-based taxes as long as the net foreign asset
position is zero. In this section, we introduce some asymmetries which highlight
how countries use source-based taxes to manipulate the terms of trade. We only
change one parameter/initial value at a time and do not recalibrate the remaining
values. This allows for a clean evaluation of the importance of different dimensions
of heterogeneity.
Differences in the Initial Asset Position In this scenario, we alter the initial asset
position of the home country so that it is 20% higher than in the foreign country.
Therefore, if everything else were the same (including the endogenous variables),
then the return to capital at home would be lower than abroad; as a result, capital
will flow from the home to the foreign country and the NFAP is positive. The home
country thus aims to increase the price of its export good (capital), and hence re-
24This inability to tax initial assets is also reflected in the path of government debt, see Figure 3.
With access to source-based capital taxes only, the government is able to reduce its debt somewhat
in the short run, but keeps a substantial positive debt burden in the long run. In the hybrid system,
the government uses asset taxes to completely pay off its original debt and even accumulate some
government assets (negative debt).
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duces the source-based tax rate to increase the global rate of return, Rt. The foreign
country has the exact opposite incentives and thus increases its source-based tax
rate. The differences in the tax rates lead to a partial reversal of capital flows. We
show the results in Table 3 and Figure 4.
Capital taxes when home country has greater initial assets
Closed economies Open economy
Period τha τfa τha τfa NFAP τhk τ
f
k
0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.15 -0.16 0.13
1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.14 -0.14 0.11
2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.13 -0.12 0.10
3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.12 -0.11 0.09
4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.12 -0.09 0.08
5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.11 -0.08 0.07
6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.10 -0.07 0.06
7 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.09 -0.06 0.06
8 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.09 -0.06 0.05
9 1.00 0.16 1.00 0.27 0.09 -0.03 0.05
10 0.77 0.00 0.62 -0.04 0.10 -0.02 0.04
11 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.11 -0.02 0.02


















50 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.10 -0.00 0.00
Table 3: τha and τhk are the home residence- and source-based capital tax rates, τ
f
a
and τfk are the foreign counterparts. NFAP is the net foreign asset position from the
point of view of the home country, expressed as a fraction of home output.
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One can also observe that the home country taxes assets more than the foreign coun-
try in a closed economy, which is unsurprising given that its initial capital stock is
larger. These differences also carry over to an open economy and the profile of sav-
ings taxes is remarkably similar to the closed economy. The home country has lower
savings taxes in period 10 in an open compared to a closed economy, but then com-
pensates with taxes slightly above zero in the following few periods. The foreign
country has slightly higher savings taxes in period 9, and compensates by slightly
negative taxes in the ensuing periods. We are not showing the labour taxes here, but
in the long run they are higher for the country with the larger initial asset position.
This can be explained by the fact that domestic households are richer and therefore
provide less labour supply, which implies higher labour taxes. Domestic govern-
ment consumption is initially higher, but converges to almost exactly the same level
as abroad, while domestic debt is always larger (except for period zero, of course).
There are small, but positive welfare effects of opening up capital markets, of 0.051%
in the home country and 0.059% in the foreign country (all welfare changes are in
terms of private consumption equivalence each period). The decomposition of the
externalities is shown in Figure 5: There is a negative terms-of-trade externality,
leading to a total negative externality in the short run. In the long run a positive
savings externality counteracts this effect, so that the total externality converges to
zero. Note that the savings externality has to equal zero while asset taxes are at
100%: a change in τfk cannot have any effect on savings then.
The units in which externalities are measured deserve explicit comment. Firstly, the
externalities are measured in current value, discounted back to the period in which
the intervention occurs, not to period 0. Secondly, they are the derivative of the
period utility function with respect to the relevant tax rate. Because the period utility
function is additively separable between consumption and labour and because it is
logarithmic in consumption, this derivative has a very concrete interpretation. It is
the percentage change in the consumption equivalent with respect to the percentage
point change in the relevant tax rate.
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The externality from the perspective of the foreign country is the (almost exact) mir-
ror image: a positive terms-of-trade externality and a negative savings externality.
The two countries would thus never agree to jointly increase or decrease source-
based capital taxes. The same applies in all of the following cases.
Differences in Government Spending Countries may also differ in their tastes for
government spending. In this exercise, we set the parameter Γh to 0.30 (Γ f stays at
0.74), so that the ratio of government spending to GDP in the pre-initial steady state
would be 0.20 in the home economy (as opposed to 0.35 in the foreign economy).
We show the results in Table 4 and Figure 6.
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Capital taxes when home country government spends less
Closed economies Open economy
Period τha τfa τha τfa NFAP τhk τ
f
k
0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00
1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01
2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.01
3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.01 -0.02 0.01
4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.02 -0.02 0.02
5 0.59 1.00 0.62 1.00 0.03 -0.03 0.02
6 0.00 1.00 0.04 1.00 0.05 -0.04 0.01
7 0.00 1.00 0.04 1.00 0.06 -0.04 0.01
8 0.00 1.00 0.04 1.00 0.07 -0.04 0.01
9 0.00 0.16 0.02 0.16 0.08 -0.02 0.02


















50 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.07 -0.00 0.00
Table 4: τha and τhk are the home residence- and source-based capital tax rates, τ
f
a
and τfk are the foreign counterparts. NFAP is the net foreign asset position from the
point of view of the home country, expressed as a fraction of home output.
The home country taxes assets less than the foreign country in a closed economy,
because its thirst for tax revenues is smaller and therefore all taxes are lower. Very
similarly to the previous case, these differences in savings taxes remain largely in-
tact in an open economy. The NFAP is negative at first, since labour taxes are lower
and hence labour supply is higher in the home country, which would lead (off-
equilibrium) to a higher marginal product of capital, and hence results in an inflow
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of capital. Interestingly, the sign of the NFAP changes and the home country be-
comes a net exporter of capital. This is because the savings taxes and labour taxes in
the home country are lower and domestic households accumulate more assets than
their foreign counterparts.
The importance of dynamics is underscored by the sign of the source-based taxes
(the magnitude is small): They are always negative for the home country and posi-
tive for the foreign country, even though the NFAP changes signs. The intuition is
that capital taxes at time t influence the terms of trade not only at time t, but also in
the other periods through the dynamic capital accumulation effects, as emphasized
in our previous work, Gross et al. (2017). Since the NFAP is smaller in magnitude
when negative than later when positive, the home country is over time effectively
a capital exporter. As before, there are very small but positive welfare gains from
capital mobility for both countries; 0.005% at home and 0.005% abroad.
The externalities, see Figure 7, reflect the changing sign of the NFAP, so that the
total externality follows a u-shaped pattern. At first, the positive terms-of-trade ex-
ternality implies a positive total externality, then both turn negative, while the total
externality converges to zero in the long run, due to the positive savings externality.
Differences in Initial Debt We now consider the case where the home govern-
ment starts with no initial debt, i.e. we set b0 = 0. In order to keep the initial capital
stock constant so that we do not confound the effects with what we observed earlier,
we also change the initial home assets a0 by the same amount. We show the results
in Table 5 and Figure 8.
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Capital taxes when home country has zero initial government debt
Closed economies Open economy
Period τha τfa τha τfa NFAP τhk τ
f
k
0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00
1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00
2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01
6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01
7 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01
8 0.12 1.00 0.14 1.00 0.02 -0.01 0.01
9 0.00 0.16 0.01 0.15 0.03 -0.01 0.01


















50 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.00
Table 5: τha and τhk are the home residence- and source-based capital tax rates, τ
f
a
and τfk are the foreign counterparts. NFAP is the net foreign asset position from the
point of view of the home country, expressed as a fraction of home output.
The home country taxes capital less than the foreign country in a closed economy,
which stems from the fact that it has lower revenue requirements to finance its ini-
tial debt. The time path of savings taxes stays almost exactly the same in an open
economy. The NFAP is initially negative, since employment is higher in the home
country, and thus the marginal product of capital would be higher if it were not for
capital inflows. Similar to the previous case, the NFAP changes signs, for exactly the
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same reasons. It is interesting to note, however, that in this case source-based capi-
tal taxes switch signs: domestic rates are initially positive and then turn negative (if
very small in magnitude) and vice versa for foreign rates.25 The welfare gains are
tiny (0.001% at home and abroad), as indicated by the small NFAP, but still positive.
The externalities, depicted in Figure 9, follow a similar pattern as in the previous
exercise, but are smaller in magnitude.
Differences in Economy Size While cross-country differences in terms of the pop-
ulation size χ or productivity Z (and appropriately rescaling the initial values a0 and
b0) lead to quite different tax rates when only source-based taxes are allowed, opti-
mal policy is still the same as in a closed economy when we allow residence-based
savings taxes. The reason is that larger economies face a lower elasticity of capital
flight with respect to their source-based tax rate, so that they can tax the initial cap-
ital stock better with source-based taxes. However, when countries tax initial assets
through savings taxes, then capital flight is not an issue and the elasticity of capital
supply does not play a role in determining optimal capital taxes.
Differences in population size or productivity do play a role once we introduce them
along with other asymmetries. For instance, when one country has larger initial as-
sets and is a larger economy, then the bigger size of its economy allows it to ma-
nipulate the terms of trade more in its favor. In Table 6 and Figure 10 we show the
results for the case when the home country’s initial asset position per capita is 20%
larger than in the symmetric case (as in our earlier exercise) and its population size
is twice that of the foreign country.
25Compared to the previous case shown in Table 4, where the tax rates did not switch signs, the
magnitudes of the future NFAPs are lower here.
45
Capital taxes when home country has a greater population and initial asset position
Closed economies Open economy
Period τha τfa τha τfa NFAP τhk τ
f
k
0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.19 -0.23 0.09
1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.18 -0.19 0.08
2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.17 -0.17 0.07
3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.16 -0.15 0.06
4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.15 -0.13 0.05
5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.14 -0.11 0.05
6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.13 -0.10 0.04
7 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.13 -0.09 0.04
8 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.12 -0.07 0.03
9 1.00 0.16 1.00 0.34 0.13 -0.04 0.04



























50 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.13 -0.00 0.00
Table 6: τha and τhk are the home residence- and source-based capital tax rates, τ
f
a
and τfk are the foreign counterparts. NFAP is the net foreign asset position from the
point of view of the home country, expressed as a fraction of home output.
In comparison with what we had observed in Table 3 when countries differed in
their initial asset position, but not country size, we see the following: The larger
country sets higher savings taxes for a longer period of time; they are still at 1%
in period 20. Moreover, the magnitude of source-based taxes is larger for the big-
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ger country and smaller for the other country—the larger country can influence the
world-wide rate of return more and uses this market power.
An interesting and potentially important implication of these results is that the
cross-border externalities of manipulating the terms of trade are less severe the
smaller each country is compared to the rest of the world. For example, if there
were a large number of countries of each of two types (with low and high initial
assets), then each country would find it difficult to change the global terms of trade
and source-based taxes would be zero. This is exactly the opposite of the fiscal
externality (with only source-based taxes), which worsens as the number of coun-
tries increases, as emphasized by the received tax competition literature. A similar
point emerges from Razin and Sadka (1991) in an essentially static model (with an
endogenous capital supply), but it bears emphasizing that the current NFAP is not
necessarily the relevant statistic when countries manipulate their terms of trade.
The welfare gains from capital mobility are a bit smaller at home (0.039%) and a bit
larger abroad (0.064%) as compared to the case when country size was the same.
This naturally follows from the fact that moving one unit of capital (per capita)
abroad leads to a larger change in the foreign rate of return when the domestic pop-
ulation is larger. We show the externalities in Figure 11, which follow the same pat-
tern as when only assets per capita differ. The magnitude is smaller, since foreign
actions influence the home country less the larger the home country is in relative
terms. For the foreign country, the externalities pattern is the mirror image of the
home country, but larger in magnitude compared to the case when only assets per
capita differ.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we explored the implications of allowing residence-based capital taxes
in a multi-jurisdiction environment where capital is mobile and endogenously ac-
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cumulated, i.e. a fully dynamic open-economy model. We prove analytically that,
in this setting, capital taxes are zero in the long run, whether there are residence-
based taxes only or both residence-based and source-based taxes. We thus extend
the results by Chamley (1986) for a closed economy, Correia (1996a) for a small open
economy, and Gross (2014) for an open economy with source-based taxes only. We
also show analytically that the fiscal externality of source-based capital taxes van-
ishes when we allow for residence-based taxes. Furthermore, the externalities from
residence-based and source-based taxes are identical, except for a terms of trade ex-
ternality from source-based taxes (which is zero when countries differ only, if at all,
by population size or productivity). All this is in sharp contrast to our results in
Gross et al. (2017), where we only allow for source-based taxes.
Our most surprising result is that governments choose identical fiscal policies in a
closed as in an open economy, when countries differ only, if at al, by population
size or productivity. In that case, the cross-country externalities are zero in all time
periods. What are the implications of this? In our previous work, we found that the
cross-country externalities with source-based taxes are zero only in the long run,
negative in the medium run, and positive (but smaller than in a static model) in the
short run. That is, in a fully dynamic model, source-based tax competition is less
grave a problem than in a static world. With residence-based taxes it ceases to be
a problem at all. In this respect, we extend earlier work in a pseudo-dynamic two-
period model, e.g. Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) and Eggert and Haufler (1999), to
an infinite horizon setting.
When countries differ with respect to other features, such as initial assets, preference
for government spending, or initial debt, so that net foreign asset positions become
non-zero, then governments use source-based taxes to manipulate the intertemporal
terms of trade in the short and medium run. This is in consonance with previous
results by De Pater and Myers (1994) in a static model with lump-sum taxes and an
exogenous labour supply and our results in Gross et al. (2017).
What are the potential policy implications of our work? Our results suggest that
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the problems of integrated capital markets in terms of harmful tax competition are
much less severe than one might have thought in light of earlier models. Cross-
border externalities only arise when there are asymmetries between countries and
therefore also gains from trade in capital. In fact, both countries experienced welfare
gains as compared to a closed economy in all our computational experiments, in
sharp distinction to the welfare losses when only source-based taxes were allowed.
Moreover, all externalities vanish in the long run. Thus we conclude, in light of
our analysis, that as information sharing across jurisdictions is enhanced, concerns
about the damaging effects of tax competition should fade away.
We end with a few caveats. In order to keep our model tractable and to establish
some baseline results in a standard environment, we abstract from several key as-
pects of fiscal policy. Here are but a few important issues that appear particularly
interesting in dynamic models: (i) heterogeneous agents and political economy (cf.
Lockwood and Makris, 2006), since the accumulation of wealth plays a major role
in determining inequality; (ii) overlapping generations, which generate a different
savings motive than with infinitely-lived dynasties (cf. Erosa and Gervais, 2002, vs.
Chamley, 1986); (iii) imperfect capital mobility and imperfect trade (cf. Janeba and
Wilson, 1999), since barriers to trade and investment are still important and affect
savings behaviour. We believe that our approach is flexible and tractable enough to
pursue these questions and thus view our paper also as a stepping stone for future
research.
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Appendix A: A closed economy




















































































































Note that it is not meaningful to distinguish between residence-based and source-
based taxes in a closed economy. We write the Lagrangian and choice set in this way
to highlight the similarities and differences with the open-economy version shown
before.
Appendix B: Calibration and the “pre-initial
steady state”
For our calibration, we would like some target moments to be met in a “pre-initial
steady state,” as outlined in Section 5.1. We do this for a closed economy, so we do
not include asset taxes (which are redundant), and drop the country superscripts.
Since it is a steady state, variables are time-invariable, and we drop time subscripts.
We use subscripts to denote derivatives, for instance we define rK ≡ ∂r/∂k. We
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do not include a first-order condition for government debt b, since it always holds
in steady state; it does not pin down any additional variables, as β(1+ R) − 1 = 0
has to hold from the household’s optimal intertemporal tradeoff. The amount of
steady-state debt is determined by initial conditions (i.e. the initial amount of debt).
We therefore replace this first-order condition with the condition that government
debt in the “pre-initial steady state” is 60% of GDP.
The system of equations that we solve (numerically) consists of the following ele-
ments:
Government budget constraint:
τkrk+ τnwn− g− bR = 0
Household budget constraint:
(1− τn)wn+ Ra− c = 0
Household optimal labor-leisure tradeoff:
ucw(1− τn) + un = 0
Household optimal intertemporal tradeoff:
β(1+ R) − 1 = 0
Capital-market clearing condition:
a− k− b = 0
Investor no-arbitrage condition:
r(1− τk) − R = 0
Government spending first-order condition :
ug −ψ = 0
51
Labour tax first-order condition :
ψwn− θwn− µucw = 0
Capital tax first-order condition :
ψk− γ = 0
Labour first-order condition :
un +ψτkkrn +ψτnnwn + θ(1− τn)nwn + µuc(1− τn)wn + γ(1− τk)rn+
ψτnw+ θ(1− τn)w+ µunn = 0
Consumption first-order condition :
uc − θ+ µuccw(1− τn) + Ruccζ = 0
Capital first-order condition :
ψτkkrk +ψτnnwk + θ(1− τn)nwk + µuc(1− τn)wk + γ(1− τk)rk +ψτkr−ω = 0
Assets first-order condition :
θ(1+ R) − θ/β+ω = 0
Interest rate first-order condition :
−ψb+ θa− γ+ ζuc = 0
Target for the net interest rate:
R− 0.04 = 0
Target for the government debt to GDP ratio:
b− 0.6f(k,n) = 0
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Target for the tax revenues to GDP ratio:
τkrk+ τnwn− 0.35f(k,n) = 0
Target for hours worked:
n− 1/3 = 0
Target for the Frisch labour-supply elasticity:
1/(σ− 1) − 0.5 = 0.
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Appendix C: Figures
Figure 1. Capital (asset) taxes under the hybrid and source-based system when
countries are symmetric
Year













Capital tax in source based system
Source based tax in hybrid system
Residence based tax in hybrid system
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Figure 2. Externalities of source-based capital taxes in source-based and hybrid
system when countries are symmetric
Year















Figure 3. Government debt under the hybrid and source-based system when
countries are symmetric
Year
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Source- and residence-based taxes
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Figure 4. Capital taxes when the home country has greater initial assets
Year














Res based tax, home
Res based tax, foreign
Source based tax, home
Source based tax, foreign
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Figure 5. Externalities when the home country has greater initial assets
Year


















Figure 6. Capital taxes when the home country government spends less
Year
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59
Figure 7. Externalities when the home country government spends less
Year




















Figure 8. Capital taxes when the home country has zero initial government debt
Year
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Figure 9. Externalities when the home country has zero initial government debt
Year



















Figure 10. Capital taxes when the home country has greater population and
stronger initial asset position
Year
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Figure 11. Externalities when the home country has greater population and
stronger initial asset position
Year
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